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Defensive Piercing of the
Corporate Veil
Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act,2 courts have liberally
enforced a strong national policy favoring arbitration of commercial disputes
In furtherance of this goal, courts have refused to stay arbitration proceedings
simply because they may involve parties who are nonsignatories to an arbitration
agreement.4 Courts have accomplished this objective through the doctrine of
equitable estoppel; Sunkist exemplifies that trend. However, Sunkist also
represents a corporate scenario in which the emerging legal theory of "defensive
piercing"' could be established as another avenue from which to compel
commercial arbitration.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1984, Del Monte Corporation ("Del Monte") acquired a wholly owned
subsidiary known as Sunkist Soft Drinks ("SSD") from General Cinema
Corporation ("GCC"). 6 Prior to this acquisition, Sunkist Growers Incorporated
("Sunkist") and SSD entered into a license agreement which included an
1. 10 F.3d 753 (11th Cir. 1993).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201-208 (1982).
3. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614,625 (1985)(quoting Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)).
4. See, e.g., J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 320 (4th Cir.
1988); Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679, 681 (5th Cir. 1976).
5. See, e.g., Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 662 (6th Cir. 1979); Reboy v.
Cozzi Iron & Metal, Inc., 9 F.3d 1303, 1308 (7th Cir. 1993); McQuade v. Draw Tite, Inc., 638 N.E.2d
818 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
6. Sunkist, 10 F.3d at 755. This dispute arose out of a complex set of events that would
ultimately encompass two lawsuits and involve four separate organizations. Id. Sunkist owns the
exclusive rights to the "Sunkist" trade-mark. Id. General Cinema Corporation (GCC) wished to obtain
the right to market and sell an orange soda under the "Sunkist" brand name. Id. As a result, the two
companies entered into a contractual agreement. Id. GCC created a subsidiary called Sunkist Soft
Drinks Incorporated (SSD) to market and sell this new product Id. Subsequently, Sunkist entered into
a contract with SSD that provided a comprehensive plan for the marketing of "Sunkist" orange soda.
1
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arbitration clause.7 In October 1987, following a lengthy controversy and several'
complaints by Sunkist regarding SSD's performance under the license agreement,8
Del Monte filed a motion to compel Sunkist to arbitrate its claims. 9
Del Monte contended that Sunkist had a contractual obligation to arbitrate all
controversies arising out of the license agreement.'0 Conversely, Sunkist did not
dispute the existence of an arbitration commitment between SSD and itself, but
maintained that Del Monte, as a nonsignatory to the agreement, had no standing
to compel arbitration." The district court granted Del Monte's motion to compel
arbitration. 2
Both parties chose an arbitrator and mutually agreed upon a neutral third
arbitrator in accordance with the arbitration clause and the Rules of the American
7. Id. The arbitration clause provided that:
Except for any claim with respect to the ownership rights in Licensed Trademarks, any
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof,
including those regarding termination or failure to renew this Agreement, shall be settled
by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and
judgment upon the award rendered by the Arbitrator may be entered in any Court having
jurisdiction thereof. The arbitration Tribunal shall be comprised of two party-designated
arbitrators, one selected by Sunkist and one selected by SSD, and a third neutral arbitrator
selected by the parties in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration
Association.
Id. (emphasis added).
8. Id. On July 18, 1986, Del Monte and SSD filed for declaratory relief against Sunkist in the
United States District Court of the Northern District of Georgia. Id. The complaint sought a
declaration that an evolving controversy over SSD's performance under its license was subject to the
arbitration clause of that agreement Id. Shortly after the original complaint was filed, SSD was sold
to a third party, Cadbury Schweppes, a fact that was reflected in Del Monte's amended complaint,
which also added Nabisco Brands, Del Monte's sister company, as a party plaintiff. Id.
Prior to resolution of the complaint, Sunkist asserted several claims resounding in both tort and
contract against SSD for alleged interference by Del Monte (SSD's parent company) with the Sunkist-
SSD license agreement. Id. On March 12, 1987, Sunkist filed a counter-claim in the Georgia action
alleging essentially the same claims as those in the California suit. Id. The counterclaims were for:
(I) Tortious interference with contract; (2) tortious interference with prospective
advantage; (3) trademark infringement; (4) unfair competition in violation of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125; (5) unfair competition in violation of the California Business Code; (6) conspiracy
to breach contract; (7) conspiracy to breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing;
(8) civil conspiracy; (9) fraudulent misrepresentation; (10) declaratory relief; and (11)
abuse of process.
Id. at 758 n.3.
On March 12, 1987 the Georgia district court approved SSD's dismissal of its claims against
Sunkist. Id. at 755. Sunkist also voluntarily dismissed SSD from the California action. Id. Finally,
on November 20, 1987, after further procedural maneuvering the California suit was transferred to the
Georgia district court becoming a companion case, thus consolidating this dispute into one lawsuit.
Id.
9. Id at 755-56.
10. Id. at 756-57.
11. Id. at757.
12. Id. at 756. Sunkist filed an interlocutory appeal from that order with the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Id. The appellate court dismissed this appeal, sua sponte, for lack
of jurisdiction in accordance with 9 U.S.C. § 16. Id
[Vol. 1995, No. I
2
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1995, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1995/iss1/11
Enforcing Arbitration with a Nonsignatory
Arbitration Association (AAA). 3 The arbitration panel found in favor of Del
Monte in a two to one decision with Sunkist's arbitrator dissenting. 4 Upon this
finding, Del Monte made a motion to confirm the award in the district court while
Sunkist made a motion to vacate the award. 5 Sunkist based its motion to vacate
on the alleged misconduct of Del Monte's chosen arbitrator. 6 The district court
confirmed Del Monte's award and subsequently denied Sunkist's motion to vacate
the award.' Sunkist's appeal followed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court, holding that a nonsignatory to a contract may invoke an arbitration
provision contained therein and that a party will be equitably estopped from
avoiding arbitration of a dispute based on another party's nonsignatory status
where the claims are intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying
contractual obligations. 8
III. LEGAL HISTORY
Historically, English courts were openly hostile to the concept of arbitration
as an alternative means for dispute resolution. 9 Accordingly, the United States
adopted the English common-law of arbitration, including the traditional common-
law view of revocability." Consequently, arbitration remained relatively stagnant
in the early period of American law.2'
However, scholars began to recognize that arbitration is an efficient
alternative to lawsuits and, therefore, well-suited to an increasingly commercial
society.22 As a result, states began passing statutes which made agreements to
arbitrate irrevocable in order to promote this beneficial practice.23





18. Id. at 756-57. The court ruled on two issues, the nonsignatory status of Del Monte to the
arbitration agreement and the alleged misconduct of Del Monte's chosen arbitrator. Id. This Note
covers only the first issue of whether Sunkist may be equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration on
grounds of a lack of a written agreement with Del Monte.
19. See Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Co., 126 F.2d 978, 983-85 (2d Cir.
1942). This hostility developed out of the courts of England that traditionally received fees for hearing
cases and did not wish to lose such fees to an arbitrator. Id. They also felt that arbitration improperly
ousted the courts from their jurisdiction. Id.
20. DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 3:01, at 22 (G. Wilner rev. ed. 1984). "The
arbitrators are authorized by each party to act in his behalf and to determine the matter in dispute.
However, in common law such agreement, like an agency relationship, is revocable at will by each
party at any time before the award is rendered." Id.
21. Id. at22.
22. See Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 610
(1928).
23. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRACT. LAW §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980).
19951
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In 1923, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). 24 The FAA
rendered contractual obligations to arbitrate disputes "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable. '25  The Supreme Court recently illustrated the purpose of the FAA
when it stated, "' [t]he preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to
enforce private agreements into which parties had entered,' a concern which
'requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.' ' ',6
Congress' policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements was quickly
reflected in court decisions such as In re Utility Oil Corp.27  Utility Oil arose
under admiralty law and involved a breach of performance where a contract
included an arbitration clause requiring the arbitration of any dispute arising
during contract performance.2 ' The issue was whether one party's breach of
performance entitled another party to have its respective claims determined by
arbitration.29 Basing its opinion on common law developed prior to the
enactment of the FAA, the district court held that the scope of this arbitration
clause did not encompass a breach of performance.3" However, on appeal the
Second circuit reversed, finding that the FAA intended to change this restrictive
view.3" Consequently, the court held that the arbitration clause covered any
dispute arising after performance began. 2 The court reasoned that nothing in the
clause required performance to continue during the dispute or arbitration and
therefore, the "purpose of this arbitration clause [was to be] carried out and the
appellee held bound by its agreement.""
24. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201-208 (1982).
25. See Id. at § 2:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such
a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id. (emphasis added).
26. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Today, it is a general rule that parties to an
arbitration agreement cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute that does not fall within the scope of
the arbitration clause. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
581 (1960). The federal courts standard for determining the scope of an arbitration clause is one of
"doubt" in which the presumption is that when in doubt err towards arbitration. See, e.g., Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Jewell
Coal & Coke Co., 735 F.2d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1984); PAS-EBS v. Group Health, Inc., 442 F. Supp.
937, 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). With such a broad standard, it is readily apparent that courts have taken
the federal policy favoring arbitration seriously, and thus construe the parties intentions to arbitrate
"generously." Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626.
27. 69 F.2d 524 (2nd Cir. 1934).
28. Id. at 524.
29. Id. at 525.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 526.
32. Id.
33. Id.
[Vol. 1995, No. I
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The courts' policy to liberally construe the scope and effect of arbitration
clauses was further strengthened in Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp.34 In Crofoot,
a California arbitration statute insightfully provided "for arbitration of any
controversy which '[arose] out of' a contract or 'any other obligation"', including
tort liability.3" Although the claims sounded in tort,36 the court held that these
charges arose out of the contract and that "[t]here is no requirement that the cause
of action arising out of a contractual dispute must be itself contractual."37
Altshul Stern & Co. v. Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd.38 further empowered
courts to compel the arbitration of claims whether they sounded in tort or
contract. 39 The court held that a "plaintiff cannot avoid the broad language of
the arbitration clause by casting its complaint in tort., 40 Because a second claim
by the plaintiff for the tort of conspiracy was substantially based on claims which
arose out of an alleged contract breach, the court held that the scope of the
arbitration clause would also apply to the plaintiff's claims sounding in tort.4'
Cases such as Crofoot and Altshul represent a significant step in judicial
interpretation of the FAA. Specifically, the FAA calls for arbitration of "a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction." 42 The federal
courts have broadly construed this language to encompass "contract-generated or
contract-related disputes between the parties; however labeled . . . it [became]
immaterial whether claims [were] found in contract or in tort."43
Finally, in Hughes Masonry Co. v. Greater Clark County School Bldg.
Corp.,44 the Seventh Circuit expressed broad support for arbitrability of
claims.45 The court held that where charges were "intimately founded in and
intertwined with the underlying contract obligations," they were within the scope
of a general arbitration clause.4' As a result, courts have broadly interpreted
arbitration clauses, allowing their scope to encompass almost any claim, whether
in tort or contract, if they are intimately founded in and intertwined with the
underlying contract obligations.47
34. 260 P.2d 156 (Cal. App. Ct. 1953).
35. Id. at 170.
36. Id. at 161.
37. Id. at 170.
38. 385 F.2d 158 (2nd Cir. 1967).
39. Id. at 159.
40. Id. See Almacenes Fernandez, S.A. v. Golodetz, 148 F.2d 625, 628-29 (2d Cir. 1945).
41. AltshulSern, 385 F.2d at 159.
42. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
43. Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Indus., Inc., 514 F.2d 614, 616 (1st Cir. 1975). See Crofoot,
260 P.2d at 170; Altshul Stern, 385 F.2d at 159 n.l.
44. 659 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1981).
45. Id. at 841.
46. Id. at 841 n.9.
47. Note that the Eleventh Circuit adopted this test in McBro Planning & Dev. Co. v. Triangle
Elec. Const. Co., 741 F.2d 342, 344 (11 th Cir. 1984).
19951
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A. Nonsignatory Inclusion: Equitable Estoppel
In furtherance of a strong policy favoring arbitration, courts have refused to
stay arbitration simply because it may involve parties who are nonsignatories to
an arbitration agreement.4" The court in Hilti, Inc. v. Oldach49 postulated that
"if arbitration defenses could be foreclosed simply by adding as a defendant a
person not a party to an arbitration agreement, the utility of such agreements
would be seriously compromised. 50
Courts have found this postulate especially useful in the commercial setting
where parent companies who are often nonsignatories to an arbitration agreement
made by their subsidiaries are routinely brought into disputes involving their
subsidiaries.5 In Lawson Fabrics, Inc. v. Akzona, Inc.,52 the court adopted
Hilti's view and denied the plaintiff's attempt to avoid arbitration when the
defendant named its owner (a nonsignatory) as a party to the action.3
Several courts have affirmed the reasoning in Lawson and have focused on
the operative facts underlying the parties' claims.54 The court in Sam Reisfeld
& Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco55 held that it was within the discretion of the
trial court to include defendant's parent company in its order to arbitrate even
though it was a nonsignatory party.56 The court justified its use of discretion by
noting that the claims against both defendants (the parent and its subsidiary) were
based on "the same operative facts" and therefore were "inherently inseparable."57
The court concluded that if "the parent corporation [were] forced to try the case,
the arbitration proceedings would be rendered meaningless and the federal policy
in favor of arbitration effectively thwarted."5" This policy favoring arbitration
is currently followed by many courts.59
48. See, e.g., J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 320 (4th Cir.
1988); Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679, 681 (5th Cir. 1976).
49. 392 F.2d 368 (1st Cir. 1968).
50. Id. at 369 n.2.
51. See, e.g., Lawson Fabrics, Inc. v. Akzona, Inc. 355 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
52. 355 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
53. Id. at 1151.
54. See, e.g., JJ. Ryan & Sons, 863 F.2d at 320.
55. 530 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1976).
56. Id. at 681.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. J.J Ryan & Sons, 863 F.2d at 321.
[Vol. 1995, No. I
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Courts have developed equitable estoppel' as the legal vehicle by which to
compel arbitration.6 The court in Avila Group Inc. v. Norma J. of California6"
found that a party cannot assert the existence of a valid contract on which to base
its claims and deny the same contract's existence to avoid arbitration. 3 Avila
held that "to allow [plaintiff] to claim the benefit of [a] contract and
simultaneously avoid its burdens would both disregard equity and contravene the
purposes underlying enactment of the Arbitration Act."'
Hughes Masonry extended the principle of equitable estoppel to compel
arbitration with a nonsignatory parent company.65 Hughes Masonry illustrates
the use of equitable estoppel to enforce the courts' liberal policy of including
nonsignatories as parties to an arbitration agreement where the claims arise out of
similar operative facts. In Hughes Masonry, the court held that a party could not
avoid the effects of an arbitration clause by superficially characterizing its claims
in tort.66 The court further held that it would be unjust to allow a party to avoid
arbitration of claims against a third-party nonsignatory defendant where those
claims arose directly from the arbitration agreement to which the third-party
defendant is a non-signatory.67 The court noted that this argument is valid only
60. Equitable Estoppel is defined as follows:
Where a party is prevented by his own acts from asserting a right to the detriment of
another party who is reasonably expected to rely on said conduct and has acted
accordingly. It is a doctrine by which a person may be precluded by his act or conduct,
or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would
have had.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 538 (6th ed. 1990).
61. See, e.g., Avila Group Inc. v. Norma J. of California, 426 F. Supp. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Tepper Realty Co. v. Mosaic Tile Co., 259 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
62. 426 F. Supp. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
63. Id. at 542. Upon an alleged breach of contract, petitioner Avila, brought a motion to compel
arbitration in federal court pursuant to an arbitration clause included within its contract with respondent
Norma J. Id. Conversely, Norma J. brought an action for damages based wholly on petitioner's
alleged breach of the same contract containing the arbitration provisions denying petitioners fight to
arbitrate this claim. Id.
64. Id.
65. Hughes Masonry, 569 F.2d at 838.
66. Id.
67. Id. The Hughes court stated:
[Plaintiff] has characterized its claims against [third party defendant] as sounding in tort,
i.e., intentional and negligent interference with contract. In substance, however, [plaintiff]
is attempting to hold [third party defendant] to the terms of the [plaintiff]-[defendant]
agreement. [Plaintiff's] complaint is thus fundamentally grounded in [third-party
defendant's] alleged breach of the obligations assigned to it in the [plaintiff-defendant]
agreement. Therefore, we believe it would be manifestly inequitable to permit [plaintiff]
to both claim that [third party defendant] is liable to [plaintiff] for its failure to perform
the contractual duties described in the [plaintiff-defendant] agreement and at the same
time deny that [third party defendant] is a party to that agreement in order to avoid
arbitration of claims clearly within the ambit of the arbitration clause. In short, (plaintiff)
cannot have it both ways. (It) cannot rely on the contract when it works to its advantage,
and repudiate it when it works to (its) disadvantage. To allow (defendant) to claim the
7
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to the extent that plaintiff's claims against the nonsignatory are closely related to
the contract.68
B. Nonsignatory Inclusion: Alter Ego Doctrine and the Instrumentality
Rule
Courts have also relied on the alter ego doctrine and instrumentality rule to
pierce the corporate veil6 9 and compel third-party nonsignatories to arbitrate.7°
The alter ego doctrine allows courts to disregard a corporate entity and hold
individuals responsible for intentional acts done in the name of the corporation."
Where the corporation is simply an alter ego, or business conduit of persons or
organizations, the protective veil of the corporation may be ignored.72 The alter
ego theory is most commonly used by plaintiffs who wish to reach beyond a
corporation to its shareholders who have used the corporation as a protective veil
to facilitate fraud while remaining immune from lawsuits. 3 The reasoning
behind this theory is that if shareholders themselves ignore the distinct legal
separation and formalities in their different corporate enterprises then the court
will also disregard these formalities to protect those individuals from certain
liabilities.74 This theory also has been used by courts where observance of the
corporate entity as a protective subterfuge would work an injustice.71 It is
important to note that a corporation may be the alter ego of another corporation,
enabling courts to treat the two corporations as one.76
benefit of the contract and simultaneously avoid its burdens would both disregard equity
and contravene the purposes underlying enactment of the Arbitration Act.
Id.
68. Id.
69. Piercing the corporate veil is defined as follows:
Judicial process whereby court will disregard usual immunity of corporate officers from
liability for wrongful corporate activities; e.g. when incorporation exists for sole purpose
of perpetrating fraud. The doctrine which holds that the corporate structure with its
attendant limited liability of stockholders may be disregarded and personal liability
imposed on stockholders, officers and directors in the case of fraud or other wrongful acts
done in name of corporation.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1147-48 (6th ed. 1990).
70. See, e.g., Federated Title Insurers, Inc. v. Ward, 538 So. 2d 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989);
Laborers' Local Union 472 & 172 v. Interstate Curb & Sidewalk, 448 A.2d 980 (N.J. 1982); In re
Sbarro Holding, Inc., 91 A.2d 613 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
71. Ivy v. Plyler, 246 Cal. App.2d 678 (Ct. App. 1966).
72. See, e.g., Gibraltar Savgs. v. LDE Brinkman Corp., 860 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1988); Firstmark
Capital Corp. v. Hempel Fin. Corp., 859 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1988).
73. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
74. Pan E. Exploration Co. v. Hufo Oils, 855 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1988).
75. See, e.g., Gibraltar, 860 F.2d 1275, 1286; Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust
Co., 855 F.2d 406, 4t4 (7th Cir. 1988).
76. McKinney v. Gannett Co., 817 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1987).
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Where a corporation is an alter ego of another corporation, such as in a
parent/subsidiary scenario, the courts often rely on the instrumentality rule."
Theoretically, the instrumentality rule and alter ego doctrine operate on
comparable rationales. "Where one corporation is so organized and controlled and
its affairs are conducted so that it is, in fact, a mere instrumentality or adjunct of
the other, the fiction of the corporate entity of the 'instrumentality' may be
disregarded.""8  The level of parental control necessary to invoke the
instrumentality rule does not require complete stock control, but rather such
domination as to effectively leave the subsidiary corporation with no mind of its
own, thereby merely acting as a conduit for its parent company."9 This total
control must be shown to have existed at the time the cause of action arose"0 and
must be the proximate cause of the complainant's injury.8 It should be noted
that some courts have not required proof of fraud or injustice; 2 instead, they
have held that dominative control alone is sufficient to hold a parent company
liable for the acts of its subsidiary. 3
Recently, under an alter ego theory, courts have found that a nonsignatory
corporation may be liable for the actions of a signatory. 4 Courts have held that
where a party seeks to enforce an agreement to arbitrate against a nonsignatory
corporation, the party must establish that the degree of control exhibited over the
subsidiary by the parent amounted to the subsidiary having no separate mind, will
or existence of its own. 5 More specifically, courts have held that where a
77. See, e.g., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th
Cir. 1973).
78. 1 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §43.10 (1990) (citing Krivo, 483 F.2d at 1098).
79. Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145 (3rd Cir. 1988).
80. See, e.g., Verreries De L'Hermitage, S.A. v. Hickory Furniture Co., 704 F.2d 140 (4th Cir.
1983).
81. Johnson v. Warnaco, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 44 (S.D. Miss. 1976) (quoting 1 FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §43 (1990)). The test may be stated as follows:
(1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not
only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked
so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will
or existence of its own; and
(2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to
perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust
act in contravention of plaintiff's legal rights; and
(3) the aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust
loss complained of.
Id.
82. See James E. McFadden, Inc. v. Baltimore Contractors, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Pa.
1985).
83. See Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 425 So. 2d 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citing
Levenstein v. Sapiro, 279 So. 2d 858 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)). But see Scott v. AZL Resources
Inc., 753 P.2d 897 (N.M. 1988).
84. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
85. See Fisser v. Int'l Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 238 (2nd Cir. 1960); Coastal States Trading, Inc. v.
Zenith Navigation S.A., 446 F. Supp. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Farkar Co. v. R.A. Hanson Disc., Ltd.,
441 F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
1995]
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subsidiary is found to be a mere "instrumentality" of its parent nonsignatory, the
corporate veil will be pierced and the parent will be bound by its subsidiary's
arbitration agreement. 6 In sum, all of the aforementioned doctrines illustrate the
courts' liberal enforcement of a federal policy favoring commercial arbitration
agreements.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Sunkist, the court began its analysis by noting the district court's use of
equitable estoppel to compel arbitration. 7 The court noted the Eleventh Circuit's
adoption of a policy where parties are equitably estopped from asserting that lack
of a written agreement is a defense precluding the courts from compelling
arbitration.8" The court highlighted the close relationships existing between the
parties as well as the interdependence of the claims to the nonsignatory's
obligations and duties in the contracts.8" Therefore, the court, having noted the
relationship between Del Monte and Sunkist, analyzed the relationship of the
claims asserted by Del Monte and Sunkist under the guidance of McBro.9"
Accordingly, the court first found that the agreement at issue in the instant
case was silent on whether Del Monte owed Sunkist any obligations or duties.9"
The court noted that the nonsignatory parties in both Hughes and Masonry were
expressly mentioned in those agreements, but that this fact had no material effect
on the outcome of either case.92 Instead, the court found that these decisions
were ultimately based on the theory that these parties necessarily had to rely on
the existing contract to assert their claims.93 The Sunkist court found that the
references to the nonsignatory third parties only added cursory support for those
court's conclusions that the claims against the third parties were "intimately
founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations.
9 4
Therefore, the court adopted the reasoning of Ryan95 and focused its inquiry on
the nature of Sunkist's underlying claims against Del Monte to determine whether
they fell within the scope of the arbitration clause contained in Sunkist's contract
with SSD.96
86. Federated Title Insurers, Inc., 890 So.2d at 891.
87. Sunkist, 10 F.3d at 757. This section of the Note does not discuss the entire decision of the
court but only those issues relevant for analysis of nonsignatory party obligations.







95. 863 F.2d at 320-21.
96. Sunkist, 10 F.3d at 757-58.
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The court found that the eleven claims brought by Sunkist against Del Monte
arguably sounded in tort.97 However, the court noted that a party may not avoid
an agreement to arbitrate simply because it casts its complaint in tort rather than
contract.9" Although Sunkist did not solely rely on its license agreement with
SSD, the court found that each claim referred to the agreement and "presume[d]
the existence of such an agreement." 99 Therefore, the court concluded that each
claim asserted by Sunkist necessarily arose out of and directly related to Sunkist's
license agreement with SSD, which included the arbitration clause."°
Additionally, the court found that SSD, upon acquisition, became an integral
part of Del Monte and lost all independent status.'" The court pointed to the
nexus between Sunkist's asserted claims and the SSD agreement and to the
integral relationship between SSD and Del Monte as the basis for its conclusion
that the claims were intimately founded in and intertwined with the license
agreement. 0 2 Therefore, the court held that Sunkist was equitably estopped
from avoiding arbitration of its claims based on Del Monte's nonsignatory status
because the claims asserted were intimately founded in and intertwined with the
underlying contract obligation.0 3
V. COMMENT
On its face, Sunkist provides a current and accurate illustration of the courts'
continued policy in favor of compelling arbitration whenever possible by extending
the policy to nonsignatory parties. 4 The court relies on the doctrine of
equitable estoppel as the avenue to which it extends this strong national policy
favoring arbitration.0" Arguably, the court has invoked this doctrine in an
appropriate manner and followed accepted precedent.0 6 However, the court did
not address whether another solution to this issue existed based on the law of
corporations.
It cannot be disputed that arbitration has played an increasingly important
role in the resolution of disputes arising in corporate America. Since so many
motions to compel or stay arbitration involve corporations as a party, one might
be tempted to look to the law of corporations for possible theories that would have
allowed Sunkist to be decided differently. Upon a cursory view of this area of the
law, it can be argued that courts faced with the issue found in Sunkist may not
97. Id. at 758.
98. Id.
99. Id. "Essentially, Sunkist contends that Del Monte, through its management and operation





104. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
105. Sunkist, 10 F.3d at 757.
106. McBro, 741 F.2d at 344.
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have to rely on the nebulous and sometimes esoteric theory of estoppel. Courts
like Sunkist may do well to consider the alter ego doctrine or the instrumentality
rule as a more precise means of compelling arbitration with third-party
nonsignatory corporations such as Del Monte.
Traditionally, the alter ego doctrine and the instrumentality rule were used
offensively by a plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil and compel arbitration with
a third-party defendant.'17 However, it is arguable that a court could rely on this
same reasoning in a defensive posture to afford equitable relief to a nonsignatory
corporation, such as Del Monte, who wishes to compel arbitration. The court's
rationale would be that where a parent corporation is deemed the alter ego of its
subsidiary, it not only bears the burden of liability arising from that relationship
but may also benefit from certain aspects of that relationship, such as the existence
of an arbitration clause. Specifically, since Del Monte is burdened by claims
arising from its subsidiary's contract with Sunkist, it should also be permitted to
benefit from the existing arbitration agreement between its subsidiary and the
appellant. In essence the court would be applying a mirror image of the
instrumentality rule/alter ego theory to deny a plaintiff the ability to avoid
arbitration with a nonsignatory where allowing such an avoidance would otherwise
work an intolerable injustice.
Parent companies assert this so called "defensive piercing" as a defense to
third-party tort liability in worker's compensation actions.' 8 In those cases, the
parent asks the court to pierce its own corporate veil and essentially hold that its
subsidiary functions as a mere instrumentality.0 9 By holding that the parent is
the alter ego of its subsidiary, the court could conceivably bar an aggrieved party
from maintaining a separate claim against the parent for tort liability limiting
plaintiff's remedy to only workmen's compensation benefits.
Generally, the courts have declined to embrace this defensive use of
piercing."0 in Reboy v. Cozzi Iron & Metal, Inc.,"' parent company Cozzi
asked the Seventh Circuit to pierce its corporate veil and hold that its subsidiary
ASP was merely an instrumentality." 2 Cozzi argued that it was so inter-related
with its subsidiary that both should be treated as one corporation for the purpose
of applying the exclusivity provision of the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act,
thereby barring plaintiff's claims of negligence against Cozzi." 3 However, the
court rejected this argument and held that "the record [was] replete with evidence
that ASP and Cozzi [were] distinct and separately operated corporations and that
Cozzi made significant and continuing efforts to maintain separate corporate
107. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 662 (6th Cir. 1979); Reboy v.
Cozzi Iron & Metal, Inc., 9 F.3d 1303, 1308 (7th Cir. 1993); McQuade v. Draw Tite, Inc., 638 N.E.2d
818 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
109. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Latham v. Technar, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1031 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
111. 9 F.3d 1303 (7th Cir. 1993).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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entities. '  While Cozzi's defensive use of piercing was rejected by that court,
the court in McQuade v. Draw Tite, Inc.," 5 surmised that "[Reboy] does not
preclude the possibility that where the evidence shows sufficient
interconnectedness, this 'reverse piercing' may be successful.""'  McQuade
focused on the issue of actual control and adopted a standard of whether "the
parent and subsidiary companies are distinct and separately operated corporations
which have made significant and continuing efforts to maintain separate corporate
entities.""' 7 Arguably, a parent found to be in actual control and not distinct or
separate from its subsidiary could successfully assert a defensive piercing of its
corporate veil. McQuade represents those courts who leave the door open to
defensive piercing where instrumentality exists.
In contrast, note that Del Monte is not attempting to avoid liability to an
injured employee; instead, Del Monte wishes to compel arbitration with an
allegedly aggrieved party. Furthermore, in the cases above, the parent and its
subsidiary were found to be separate and distinct, while it is arguable that SSD is
an instrumentality of Del Monte because they are neither separate nor distinct."'
In comparing the facts of Sunkist with those of the aforementioned worker's
compensation cases, it appears that Sunkist contains attributes ripe for a successful
assertion of defensive piercing.
Although the decision is vague on the exact relationship between Del Monte
and SSD, the court referred to SSD as a "wholly owned subsidiary" where "Del
Monte effectively stripped SSD of its employees and management and any other
separate operating status."" 9 Without knowing more, it is arguable that Del
Monte has exhibited the kind of domination and control required by the alter ego
doctrine and instrumentality rule. As stated earlier, piercing the corporate veil
through application of the instrumentality rule essentially requires that a parent
corporation use control of its subsidiary to proximately cause fraud or wrong on
a complaining party. 2°
With respect to control, courts have held that where a party seeks to enforce
an agreement to arbitrate against a nonsignatory corporation, that party must
establish that the degree of control exhibited over the subsidiary by the parent
amounted to the subsidiary having "no separate mind, will or existence of its
own." '' In Farkar Co. v. R.A. Hanson Disc., Ltd., 22 the court adopted this
standard and held that the parent corporation was compelled to arbitrate a contract
dispute where its subsidiary's officers and directors were identical to the parent,
114. Id.
115. 638 N.E.2d 818 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
116. Id. at 820.
117. Id. at 821.
118. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
119. Sunkist, 10 F.3d at 755.
120. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
122. 441 F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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the parent and subsidiary both used the same trade name, the subsidiary had no
employees and the subsidiary maintained no inventory or office separate from
parent.1
23
Generally, Del Monte would have had to use such control to commit a fraud
or wrong. 24 In Sunkist, arbitration resulted in an award in favor of Del
Monte, 25 which was upheld by the district court and affirmed by the appellate
court. 26 Consequently, one can infer that Del Monte was not found to have
worked a fraud which was specifically noted as one of Sunkist's claims.'27
However, some courts have not required fraud or injustice to be proved; 28
instead, they have found that dominative control alone is sufficient to hold a
parent company liable for the acts of its subsidiary. 29 If the court in Sunkist
chose to adopt this reasoning, then it would not necessarily have to determine the
issue of fraud in holding that SSD was the instrumentality of Del Monte.
Finally, it must be shown that Del Monte's aforesaid control was the
proximate cause of the injury complained of by Sunkist. 3 ' Arguably, Sunkist
firmly believed Del Monte was the proximate cause of its injury, but this would
be a determination for the court. On the limited information presented by the
court, it would be mere speculation to determine whether proximate cause did in
fact exist.
Assuming that Del Monte did exhibit dominative control so as to make SSD
an instrumentality, the court may do well to compel arbitration based on the rule
grounded in the theory that Del Monte is the alter ego of SSD. Had Sunkist
wished to compel arbitration with Del Monte, the court arguably would have
pierced Del Monte's corporate veil and compelled the arbitration. Likewise where
Sunkist attempts to use Del Monte's alleged corporate veil based on its
nonsignatory status to avoid arbitration, the court should not allow the corporate
veil to work an injustice. It should follow its policy favoring arbitration and give
Del Monte the benefit of its bargain.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Sunkist decision represents an accurate culmination of the courts' use of
equitable estoppel to compel arbitration with nonsignatory corporations in
furtherance of a strong national policy favoring commercial arbitration of disputes
arising in corporate America. The use of estoppel by the court is appropriate in
123. Id.
124. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
125. Sunkist, 10 F.3d at 756.
126. Id. at 760.
127. Id. at 758 n.3.
128. See, e.g., James E. McFadden, Inc. v. Baltimore Contractors, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D.
Pa. 1985).
129. See supra note 86 and accompanying text
130. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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that a corporation will not be allowed to avoid the effects of an arbitration clause
based on the nonsignatory status of defendant while simultaneously asserting
claims against the nonsignatory party arising from the same contract. Equity
demands such an outcome. However, the court in Sunkist may have missed an
excellent opportunity to step beyond the esoteric language of estoppel and base its
equitable decision on the established rule of corporate instrumentality and alter ego
doctrine. Where a parent and its subsidiary demonstrate an intense inter-
connectedness, the court could "defensively" pierce the parent corporation's
protective veil and compel plaintiff to arbitrate its claims with a nonsignatory
parent, such as Del Monte. By relying on an established rule of law, the court
provides parties with standards of proof based on solid precedent rather than the
often uncertain and arbitrary nature of a courts invocation of equitable estoppel.
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